Relative to other countries in Latin America, Brazil has high rates of taxation and large social spending. We estimate the redistributive effect of fiscal policy on income distribution and poverty in Brazil using household survey data that contain detailed information about many labor and non-labor income sources, direct taxes paid, contributions to the pension system, transfers received, use of public education and health services, and consumption. The rich detail of our data set allows us to single out the effects of each direct tax and transfer without simulating taxes or benefits. On the spending side, we find that although Brazil has some well-targeted anti-poverty programs, a large portion of direct transfer beneficiaries are non-poor and inequality and poverty reduction are low relative to Brazil's spending. On the tax side, indirect taxes paid by the poor often surpass the benefits they receive.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, Brazil has had one of the highest levels of inequality in the world; in 1989, for example, Brazil had a Gini coefficient of 0.63, making it the second most unequal country in the world, narrowly behind Sierra Leone (Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield 2008) . Over the last decade, however, inequality has been falling in Brazil, as in other countries in Latin America (Lustig and López-Calva 2010) . Indeed, inequality has fallen in Brazil in every year since 2001. 1 The recent decline is largely due to increased public cash transfers (Barros et al. 2010 ) and a more equal distribution of educational attainment resulting from expanded access to education in the 1990s (Gasparini and Lustig 2011) . Social spending has become both larger and more progressive (Silveira et al. 2011) . Poverty has decreased in every year since 2003-despite the recent recession-regardless of whether poverty is measured by the headcount index, poverty gap index, or squared poverty gap index.
2 Brazil's conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família is very effective at reducing poverty (Soares 2012) , especially in rural areas (Higgins 2012 ).
Our goal is to estimate the redistributive effect of fiscal policy in Brazil using the Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF), [2008] [2009] . In particular, we estimate the effects of taxation (direct and indirect) as well as cash transfers and in-kind benefits on income distribution and poverty. The rich detail of our data set allows us to single out the effects of each direct tax and transfer without needing to simulate taxes or benefits. This has the advantage that unlike incidence studies based on microsimulation models, our study is based on what individuals actually pay and receive (assuming they report correctly), rather than what tax and program rules dictate they should pay.
Recent incidence analyses for Brazil include Immervoll et al. (2009) , Nogueira, Siqueira, and Souza (2011) , and Silveira et al. (2011) . The first two use a different data set, the Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domicílio (PNAD)-which has no information on taxes or contributions and very limited information about cash transfers-in combination with tax/benefit microsimulation models. As a result, they measure the incidence of the fiscal system according to its rules, rather than in practice. There are many reasons that the incidence of the fiscal system could be different in practice than in theory, such as evasion, exclusion, and leakages. Silveira et al. (2011) use the same data set that we do, but their analysis has a different treatment of social security payments and indirect taxes. In particular, they treat social security pensions as a government transfer, while in our main analysis we treat them as part of market income; we also include a sensitivity analysis in which they are treated as a government transfer. And, contrasting with their study, we use effective indirect tax rates instead of the legal rates. According to Siqueira, Nogueira, and Souza (2010) , the use of legal rates greatly overestimates the effective rate paid.
Our contribution is to undertake a comprehensive incidence analysis for Brazil, including both indirect taxes and in-kind benefits from public education and health, to assess the distributive impact of various fiscal interventions and the fiscal system as a whole. By using a consistent methodology (see Lustig, Pessino, and Scott 2012) , the results for Brazil will be comparable to those of other countries. We take a neutral stance on 1 This observation is a result of authors' calculations using micro-data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD); the result holds regardless of whether inequality is measured by the Gini, mean log deviation, or Theil's T index. Furthermore, following Atkinson (1969) , we can state that inequality was unambiguously lower in 2011 than in 2001 using any inequality measure that reflects a social welfare function that is an additively separable and symmetric function of individual incomes, since the Lorenz curve for 2011 Lorenz dominates that of 2001 and mean real income was higher in 2011. 2 Headcount rates over the period 1995-2011 are available from IPEA (2012) and poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices over the period 1981 . the treatment of contributory pensions, a matter on which there is no agreement in the literature, by presenting results with pensions treated as part of market income (hereafter called the benchmark scenario) and a sensitivity analysis with them treated as a government transfer.
Our results show that in comparison to the other countries included in this issue, Brazil has relatively high taxation and spending, but poor targeting of direct transfers overall, and low inequality and poverty reduction relative to its spending. Some programs, such as Bolsa Família and Benefício de Prestação Continuada, are well-targeted, but they make up a small share of social spending. Others, such as unemployment benefits and special circumstances pensions, are large and progressive only in relative terms. While public health spending is progressive in absolute terms for each type of care, tertiary education spending is almost neutral in relative terms, indicating that the better-off receive most of the benefits.
Overall, direct taxes and transfers reduce the Gini by 6 percent, and in-kind transfers are particularly equalizing: the reduction between the market income and final income Ginis is 19 percent.
3 Although Brazil's market income Gini is substantially higher (by at least 5 percentage points) than that of any of the other countries included in this special issue, its final income Gini is almost identical to Peru's. Indirect taxes have a deleterious effect on post-fiscal income and often result in post-fiscal income poverty being higher than market income poverty.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the social spending and taxation systems in Brazil. Section 3 describes the data used as well as the methodology, focusing on aspects of the methodology that are unique to Brazil. Section 4 summarizes the mains results of our incidence analysis. The main conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in section 5.
SOCIAL SPENDING AND TAXATION IN BRAZIL i Social Spending
Social spending as defined in the benchmark scenario accounts for 16 percent of GDP in Brazil. This figure includes social assistance (direct transfers and other social assistance spending), health spending, and education spending and includes spending at the federal, state, and municipal levels. If we also include spending on contributory pension payments as part of social spending, as is often done, social spending is 25 percent of GDP.
4 Direct transfers include conditional cash transfers programs, non-contributory pensions, food transfers, unemployment benefits, special circumstances pensions, and others. In-kind transfers are benefits received from the universal free public education and health systems. The main programs are described below, and their budget sizes are given in Table 1. Bolsa Família, Brazil's flagship conditional cash transfer program, transfers cash to eligible families in exchange for complying with certain conditions. Eligible families are poor families with children less than eighteen years of age or with pregnant women, and all extreme poor (the latter group is regardless of having children). Eligibility is determined through partially-verified means testing; households with income below the cut-offs are incorporated into the program. Income is self-reported and partially verified by crosschecking it against formal sector employment databases and other social program databases. Families in the program have an electronic card they can use to withdraw their monthly transfer at ATMs. The conditions are pre-natal and post-natal care sessions for pregnant women, adherence to a calendar of vaccinations for children ages zero to five, and a minimum level of school attendance for children ages six to seventeen. There are no conditions for the "fixed benefit" given to extremely poor households. The average monthly benefit in 2009 was approximately 95 reais per month ($1.82 PPP per day) per beneficiary family, both according to the Ministry of Social Development and household survey data (Souza, Osório, and Soares 2011 Special circumstances pensions (Pensões and Outros benefícios) are funded by the contributory pension system, but they are considered non-contributory, as opposed to the normal retirement and disability pensions paid by the social security system (Aposentadorias and Benefício mensal ao deficiente e ao idoso; hereafter "contributory pensions"). The special circumstances pensions are paid in the case of an accident at work, sickness, or related idiosyncratic shock. They are considered non-contributory because they have low or no requirements in terms of length of time of contribution and are designed to smooth the impact of idiosyncratic shocks or are means-tested. In 2009, there were about 2.9 million beneficiaries. In the benchmark scenario, special circumstances pensions are considered a government transfer, while contributory pensions are considered part of market income. In sensitivity analysis 1, we consider contributory pensions as a government transfer along with special circumstances pensions. In sensitivity analysis 2, we consider both contributory and special circumstances pensions as part of market income.
5 Further details about the transfer size are as follows. According to the program rules, the transfer amount was, in 2009, 22 reais per month (US$0.42 PPP per day) per child ages zero to fifteen (up to three children), and 33 reais per month (US$0.63 PPP per day) per adolescent ages sixteen to seventeen (up to two adolescents) for families with income below 140 reais per capita per month (US$2.69 PPP per day) and at least one child under eighteen or a pregnant woman (the "variable benefit"), and an additional 68 reais (US$1.31 PPP per day) for households with income below 70 reais per capita per month (US$1.34 PPP per day), regardless of whether there are children (the "fixed benefit"). For more information about the program, Soares (2012) provides an excellent overview of its history, design features, and impact.
Education in Brazil is free at all education levels, including preschool and tertiary education. There is also free public daycare provided for poor families. The large majority of Brazilians attending school are enrolled in the public system: 85 percent of elementary students, 86 percent of secondary students, and 75 percent of post-secondary students. Health care is free for all types of care: instead of a national health insurance system, as is common in many countries, Brazil has the Unified Health System (SUS in Portuguese) created by the 1988 Constitution, which guarantees access to health care to every citizen at public health facilities. ii The Brazilian Tax System
There are more than eighty-five taxes in Brazil (Portal Tributário 2012). Total tax revenues were about 35 percent of GDP in 2009. Direct taxes represent 45 percent of the taxes levied by the government and indirect taxes represent 55 percent. Individuals are required to file personal income tax returns if taxable income goes above the exemption limit of one monthly minimum wage. There are exemptions for taxpayers filing jointly and dependents, as well as allowances for health insurance and educational expenses. The standard deduction is equivalent to 20 percent of the taxable income (marginal rates range from 15 to 27.5 percent). Less than 10 percent of the economically active population pays income tax. Corporate taxable income is taxed at 25 percent. In addition, businesses must pay social contribution taxes on profits (9 percent on net taxable income).
Many indirect taxes operate each with their own administering department which may be at the federal, state, or municipal level. The most important indirect tax is the Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS), a state tax levied on the sale or physical movement of goods, freight, transportation, communication services, and electricity. Intrastate transactions are taxed at 18 percent on average, interstate transactions are taxed at 7 percent or 12 percent, and imports are taxed at a rate between 4 percent and 25 percent. Intrastate rates are determined at the state level and interstate rates are regulated by the Brazilian Senate. Communication services are taxed at a rate between 13 and 25 percent. ICMS revenue accounts for 21 percent of the tax collection in 2009. Other important indirect taxes are the COFINS (federal tax to finance the social security deficit), ISS (municipal tax on services), PIS (federal tax to finance social services for workers), and IPI (federal tax on industrial products). They correspond to 10.8, 4.1, 2.9, and 2.8 percent of total tax collection, respectively (table 2) .
The Brazilian tax system is exceedingly complex and the "cascading effect" is one of its major distortions (Amaral, Olineike, and Amaral 2007) . The cascading effect derives from the fact that taxes levied at the federal, state, and municipal levels compound on each other. This occurs because the taxes are applied to the final sales price of the good (including taxes), not the pre-tax sales price. About 18 percent of the collected revenue in 2003 was attributed to compounded taxes resulting from the cascading effect (Siqueira, Nogueira, and Souza 2010) , and the overall cost of the distortions created by it was about 2 percent of GDP (Amaral, Olineike, and Amaral 2007 ).
As we are analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on income inequality and poverty, the distortions created are even more important, considering the effects of indirect taxes on consumer purchasing power. The effective rates paid on basic food products in Brazil can be especially deleterious for the poor. According to Siqueira, Nogueira, and Souza (2010) , the effective tax rate on the basic food basket is 13.1 percent on average, despite the lower ICMS rates for food. Because the poor spend a larger proportion of their income on food, they are hit very hard by the amount of indirect taxes, as shown in section 4. 
DATA
The data on household incomes, taxes and transfers come from the Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (Family Expenditure Survey, POF), [2008] [2009] . This survey has national coverage, sampling 56,091 households using a two-stage stratified sample design, and is conducted approximately once every five years. It contains detailed information about many labor and non-labor income sources, direct taxes paid, transfers received, use of public education, and consumption. 6 When POF does not include questions on certain items (such as the amount of consumption taxes paid), the values are imputed following the methodologies described below. Data on the use of public health services come from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (National Household Sample Survey, PNAD), 2008, which contains income data and a detailed supplemental health survey containing the necessary information regarding the use of public health services. PNAD 2008 has national coverage, sampling 118,138 households using a three-stage stratified sample design. The main survey is conducted annually except in census years; the health supplement, however, was only conducted in 2003 and 2008. 7 Data on government revenues and spending, which are used to scale up household survey data for the inequality (but not poverty) calculations, come from Brazil's national accounts. 8 The amounts received in direct transfers and paid in direct taxes are directly identified from the survey. The number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries captured by the survey (7.3 million households), however, is significantly lower than the number reported in national accounts (12.4 million households).
9 Souza (2010) shows that much of this discrepancy can be attributed to the survey's sample design. To correct for this problem, we use a propensity score matching method suggested by Souza, Osório, and Soares (2011) to impute benefits to the missing 5.1 million households, selecting households who are very similar to beneficiary households but did not report receiving benefits. After applying this method, both the number of beneficiaries and the total program benefits in our data approximate the corresponding amounts in national accounts. This method has very little impact on inequality results, increases the poverty-reducing impact of direct transfers, and increases the coverage of direct transfers among the poor, compared to the results when the method is not implemented. Results without this method are available from the authors upon request.
The amounts paid in indirect taxes are not available from POF; instead we use the incidence of indirect taxes calculated by Siqueira, Nogueira, and Souza (2010) by decile, and assume that all individuals within each decile pay the same proportion of their income to indirect taxes. In preliminary results not reported here, we instead compute indirect taxes using consumption data from POF and effective tax rates calculated by Siquiera, Nogueira, and Souza (2010) for various groups of consumption items. The negative impacts of indirect taxes are even more pronounced when the amount paid by each household in indirect taxes is computed using consumption data.
10
In-kind education benefits are equal to the average spending per student by level (early childhood development, pre-school, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary), which is obtained from national accounts and imputed to students who attend public school. To estimate in-kind health benefits, we take advantage of the supplement to the 2008 PNAD survey, which asks detailed questions relating to the use of health services. POF, on the other hand, has no questions that would allow us to distinguish who uses public health facilities. We first group the types of health services reported in PNAD into the three 7 For more information on the PNAD survey, see IBGE (2008) . 8 For the precise sources of the components of social spending, see table 1. On the revenue side, the source of the total for direct taxes is Ministério da Fazenda (2010) and it includes income taxes paid by employers. The source of the total for employee contributions to social security is Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social (2009) and is calculated as a residual: it is calculated as total contributions minus employer contributions minus others' contributions. The source for the total for indirect taxes is Ministério da Fazenda (2010). 9 The number of transfer beneficiaries reported by Brazil's Ministry of Social Development is regarded to be accurate. Beneficiaries are part of the Cadastro Único (Single Registry) database; information in the database is collected by municipal agents, then sent to the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and Caixa Econômica Federal, the government-controlled bank responsible for transfer payments. Thus, the number of beneficiaries reported by MDS matches those receiving payments through Caixa Econômica Federal. In addition, the list of Bolsa Família recipients is part of an open access database. 10 We opt to use a secondary source for indirect taxes rather than consumption data for the time being due to the following problem: some households have reported consumption much higher than reported income, likely as a result of either income underreporting, dissaving, or borrowing. For approximately 1 percent of our sample, this results in negative post-fiscal income when indirect taxes computed by combining consumption data and effective tax rates are subtracted from disposable income.
aggregate categories for which we have spending by state in national accounts: primary care, in-patient care, and preventative care. Then, for each of Brazil's twenty-six states plus the Federal District, we calculate the average benefit received per health facility visit by dividing the total spent in that state (combining spending at the federal, state, and municipal levels) by the total number of patient visits in the past year when the patient received that particular type of care. Then the values obtained for these benefits, which vary by state and type of care, are imputed to the households that report receiving that type of health service from the Unified Health System (essentially, from a free public health facility). Our method closely follows the best practices for health benefit incidence analysis outlined in O'Donnell et al. (2008) .
Since PNAD includes many questions about income as well, we are able to construct an income definition that is similar to market income. We calculate the concentration coefficients of each type of health care directly in the PNAD data set. To generate final income, however, we must impute health benefits back into the POF data, so we calculate average health benefits by groups of 5 percent of the population (vintiles), ranked by income, and add this value to each individual in the corresponding POF vintile. Thus, to construct final income we are essentially assuming that each individual receives the average benefit received by his or her vintile. While this assumption is not realistic, the point estimates of the concentration coefficients for total health spending in PNAD (where in-kind health benefits are imputed at the household level based on reported use of health services) and POF (where we impute health spending by vintile) are approximately equal and statistically not significantly different.
RESULTS
To assess the impact of taxes and social spending, we use a variety of measures of inequality and poverty, the concentration of benefits received and taxes paid with respect to market income, and effectiveness indicators.
11 Our results show that market income inequality is very high in Brazil, with a Gini coefficient of 0.57 (table 3) . Through direct taxes and transfers, Brazil is able to reduce inequality by 6 percent, which is impressive by Latin American but not Western European standards.
12 Through all taxes and transfers (direct and indirect taxes and direct and in-kind transfers), Brazil reduces inequality by 19 percent. Our results are consistent with Immervoll et. al. (2009) , who demonstrate the limited redistributive effects of fiscal policy in Brazil (using a different data set and microsimulations), despite its high level of taxation (35 percent of GDP) and high spending on social programs. Given its high spending, it is no surprise that the effectiveness indicators for Brazil's inequality reductions are low. The effectiveness indicators for direct transfers and all transfers, respectively, are 0.89 and 1.32 in the benchmark scenario. These indicate relatively low effectiveness: Brazil's direct transfer effectiveness indicator is tied with Bolivia for the lowest among all countries in this special issue.
To measure the impact of fiscal policy on poverty in a middle income country, we use the international poverty lines proposed by the World Bank of US$1.25 PPP per day (ultra poverty), US$2.50 PPP per day (extreme poverty), and US$4.00 PPP per day (moderate poverty), as well as the lines used to determine eligibility for Bolsa Família's fixed benefit (70 reais per month [$1.34 PPP per day]) and variable benefit (140 reais per month [$2.69 PPP per day]). Ultra poverty is reduced by 55 percent by direct transfers (net of any direct taxes paid), extreme poverty by 28 percent, and moderate poverty by just 14 percent. However, when indirect taxes are considered, the reduction in ultra poverty is significantly tempered, the reduction in extreme poverty nearly disappears, and moderate poverty actually increases when one compares market income with post-fiscal income. In other words, the number of near-poor who are pushed into moderate poverty by paying more in taxes than they receive in benefits is higher than the number of poor who escape poverty by receiving more in transfers than they pay in taxes. The moderate success of direct transfers at reducing poverty can be attributed to high coverage of the poor: 85 percent of the poor live in households receiving at least one direct transfer; the figure is even higher among the extreme poor (93 percent) and the ultra poor (98 percent). The fact that poverty is not reduced further despite Brazil's high spending on direct transfers is due to high leakages to the non-poor (in addition to the deleterious effect of indirect taxes): 74 percent of total direct transfer benefits go to the non-poor. As a result, the amount remaining to transfer to the poor is spread thinly: the average transfer size of Bolsa Família, for example, is just US$0.35 PPP per day in household per capita terms. Table 4 shows concentration coefficients and budget sizes for direct transfer programs, contributory pensions, education and health spending, and overall social spending. Bolsa Família and BPC are well targeted to the poor, with concentration coefficients of -0.58 and -0.48, respectively. However, unemployment benefits, special circumstances pensions, scholarships, and other direct transfers are progressive only in relative terms (i.e., their concentration curves with respect to market income lie everywhere between the market income Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line and, thus, are equalizing). As a result of these opposing forces, the concentration curve of direct transfers as defined in the benchmark case crosses the 45 degree line (figure 1), implying that they are progressive, but not everywhere progressive in absolute terms. The curve is initially concave and above the 45 degree line of inequality; the bottom two quintiles receive a larger share of direct transfers than their population share. However, a large chunk of transfers (relative to population shares) are concentrated at the top of the distribution as well. The shape of the curve is not surprising, as highly progressive programs like Bolsa Família are concentrated on the bottom quintile while other direct transfers are concentrated at the top. Contributory pensions, which are considered a government transfer in sensitivity analysis 1, are progressive in relative terms with a concentration coefficient of 0.06. Total direct transfers plus contributory pensions are progressive in relative terms with a concentration coefficient of 0.02, and total social spending plus contributory pensions are progressive in absolute terms with a concentration coefficient of -0.03. Note that when we assess the progressivity of contributory pensions, we assess it with respect to sensitivity analysis 1 market income, which by definition does not include contributory pensions. As explained in Immervoll et al. (2009) , many recipients of contributory pensions have low income in the absence of contributory pensions but high incomes after including them. If contributory pensions are being treated as a government transfer, the concentration coefficients should therefore be calculated with respect to pre-transfer income, which cannot include contributory pensions. The misconception that contributory pensions are "highly regressive" derives from the fact that their concentration coefficient is often calculated with respect to disposable income, which is an income concept that includes contributory pensions.
FIGURE 1. CONCENTRATION CURVES WITH RESPECT TO MARKET INCOME (BENCHMARK ANALYSIS), BRAZIL 2009
Source: Authors' elaboration based on Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares, 2008 Moving to in-kind benefits, education spending is progressive in absolute terms overall; its only component that is not progressive in absolute terms is tertiary education. It is worth noting that the concentration coefficient of tertiary education, at 0.43, makes Brazil one of the worst performers in Latin America in terms of providing tertiary education access to the poor. Health spending and all of its components are progressive in absolute terms. Overall social spending is progressive in absolute terms-this is a robust result that holds for the different definitions of social spending that arise in the benchmark scenario and sensitivity analyses, as shown in table 4. Although overall social spending is not everywhere progressive in absolute terms in all three scenarios (i.e., its concentration curve does not lie entirely above the 45 degree line), it is everywhere progressive over the domain of the poorest three quarters of the population in all three scenarios.
CONCLUSIONS
We calculate the effects of fiscal policy on income distribution and poverty in Brazil. In terms of direct transfers, Brazil has relatively high spending, poor targeting, and low effectiveness. Bolsa Família and BPC are well-targeted to the poor and highly progressive in absolute terms, but other much larger direct transfers are progressive only in relative terms. Brazil is also a relatively high spender on health and education compared to the other countries studied in this special issue. With the exception of tertiary education, all components of public health and education spending are progressive in absolute terms.
Our analysis finds a troublesome result when taking into account post-fiscal income: there is a substantial deleterious effect of indirect taxes on poverty. In many cases, the benefits of transfer programs are offset by indirect taxes. A reform of the indirect tax system, especially with respect to taxes on basic food items, must be a high priority. Following Musgrave's (1959) assertions with respect to distribution, Brazil is moving in the right direction by decreasing income inequality through fiscal policy. However, despite the fact that transfer payments increased significantly recently, they were associated with an even higher level of taxation. Taxation as proportion of GDP increased by more than 50 percent in Brazil over the last two decades (Amaral et al. 2011) . In addition, according to García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011) , the consequences of tax increases on income distribution depend mainly on how the resulting revenues are spent. The elasticity of labor supply also plays a crucial role, reinforcing or offsetting the redistributive impact of taxes. In particular, the dynamics of the response of income inequality depends on two effects: changes in labor supply and changes in the distribution of capital and factor prices during the transition to the new steady state. They can move in opposite directions, so the response to fiscal policy is nonmonotonic. Further research would require analysis on the dynamic effects of Brazil's redistributive policies on labor supply. Finally, our policy recommendations include: (1) a reform of the indirect tax system, especially regarding basic food taxes-surprisingly enough, Brazil's President Dilma Rouseff recently vetoed a proposal to end or drastically reduce taxes on basic food items; 13 (2) expansion of Bolsa Família; (3) an increase in Bolsa Família and BPC's eligibility cut-offs to include the ineligible poor; and (4) increased access to tertiary education for the poor.
